Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Neurolaw: Brains in the Courtroom


Regular readers of this blog know we often touch on issues about law and neuroscience: whether  it’s about crime, the lie detection seminar Emory hosted last spring, or work on ethics and free will. (Also, spoiler alert, neurolaw is to be the focus of our next journal club meeting- please come!) The field of neurolaw, which is exactly what it sounds like- neuroscience and law, has been growing rapidly over the past decade. Most of the discussions in neurolaw focus on how, and if, new discoveries in neuroscience will affect legal definitions of responsibility and culpability by changing the way we understand how the decision to commit a crime is made. However- in the past year there have been several studies looking at another side of brains the courtroom: that is, the neuroscience of judgment itself. These studies are exploring how people consider evidence and how they balance moral and ethical decisions against empathic and sympathetic reactions. This new work opens up new avenues for interventions from neurolaw and neuroethics around the construction and use of institutions like the judge and the jury.
Science says: Lock 'em up.
(image courtesy of Special Collections, University of Houston Libraries)

Although I want to focus here on what I think is a new area of neurolaw, I’ll begin with a recent study that exemplifies the sort of work that is traditionally considered in the field. In August of 2012, Science published an article by Lisa G. Aspinwall, Teneille R. Brown and James Tabery of the University of Utah titled “The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges' Sentencing of Psychopaths?” This study focuses on the sentencing portion of a criminal trial, where judges decide how to punish a person who has already been convicted. They weigh aggravating factors (basically evidence that the person should get a longer sentence) against mitigating factors (basically, evidence that the person should get a shorter sentence.) In this study, researchers gave 181 trial judges a hypothetical case (based on a real case, Mobley v. State)[1] where the convicted person had been diagnosed with psychopathy. All judges received the same psychiatric testimony of diagnosis, but some were also given additional proof of psychopathy in the form of  “expert testimony from a neurobiologist who presented an explanation of the biomechanism contributing to the development of psychopathy (here, low MAOA activity, atypical amygdala function, and other neurodevelopmental factors).” (846) Judges who received the version with the additional biomedical information were more likely to list mental illness or psychopathy as a mitigating factor. One judge, quoted in the article, said that the biomedical evidence “makes possible an argument t that psychopaths are, in a sense, mo- rally 'disabled' just as other people are physically disabled.” (847) Judges who received the additional information gave sentences that were, on average, a little over a year shorter.

This study touches on a concept I talked about last month- namely that there is a distinction between innate and acquired mental disorders when it comes to sympathy and empathy. However, unlike what I talked about in that post, this study shows that perhaps it is not the origin of a behavior which is significant, but how tangible the evidence for that behavior is. It is telling that the anonymous judge quoted in the article described psychopathy as a moral disability rather than a moral disorder, seeing morality as a capacity that can be limited with a physical disruption to the limb. Although the results don’t seem that significant- remember that this study wasn’t about deciding guilt – it is important to note, as the authors themselves do, that the crime they discuss was a particularly violent one and the assailant was presented, in all versions of the case, as entirely lacking in empathy or remorse. Taking that into consideration, the one-year difference in sentencing is a bit more significant, and it is possible that there would be even larger discrepancies in cases that are less violent or less reprehensible. I am interested to see if further work is done.

Image by Abu badali, based on public domain Aiga's icons.

Where Aspinwall et al. focused on the impact of different types of evidence on judgment, the other two studies I want to highlight looked at the neuroscience of judging itself. In February of 2012, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience published an article from a team at George Mason University about the role of oxytocin in the perception of crime. A group of male subjects were given oxytocin (or placebo) and then asked to read a series of descriptions of crimes.[2] They were then asked, as unaffiliated third-parties, to rate the crimes in terms of the degree of harm caused to the victim and then rate how much the offenders deserved to be punished.  The researchers that those administered oxytocin were more likely to see increased harm to the victims but that this did not significantly impact how much they thought the assailants should be punished.[3]The authors of the study emphasized that it was important that the subjects saw themselves as an uninvolved third-party – first, because this removed the confounding factor of personal relationship to either victim or perpetrator, and second, because it more closely mimicked the circumstances of a jury trial.

image from the Library of Congress
Clarence Darrow, lawyer most likely to
make all sorts of borderline prejudicial remarks
(image in the Public Domain)
In a similar study, published in the March 2012 of Nature Communications, a team of researchers in Japan used fMRI machines to measure neural activity in people while they were making decisions about punishing a convicted murderer. The study was designed to examine how arguments designed to elicit sympathy mapped onto brain regions and, in turn, how those were utilized in the decision making process. The researchers found that, in fact, brain activity was consistent with regions previously associated with sympathy and that the sympathetic response was correlated with shorter sentences. This left the research team with the following question: Although judges often instruct jury members to disregard certain prejudicial remarks while making their decisions, such as pleas for sympathy or comments not admitted to the record, is it reasonable to ask people to do such a thing?

These studies open a possibility within neurolaw for an examination of the institution of the jury trial, raising important ethical questions about how we, as citizens, make moral judgments, and the level of conscious control we can have over our sympathetic reactions. The jury trial is a sacred institution within United States law, and for good reason.  Yet so far, the nacent field of neurolaw has focused almost exclusively on the impact neuroscientific evidence will have on the courtroom in terms of how it reframes criminal actions. Neuroscience, and most importantly neuroethics, is giving us more information about morality in general. What will happen to the jury trial if it is found that people cannot lay aside urges for sympathy, no matter how they are instructed? Or what if it turns out we are able to judge situations in which we are an uninvolved third-party with more reason than we do situations where we have personal involvement, regardless of the level of empathy we may feel for the persons involved? How will this work change the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, if at all? And should they?



Want to cite this post?
Cipolla , C. (2012). Neurolaw: Brains in the Courtroom. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2012/10/neurolaw-brains-in-courtroom.html



[1] In 1995, Stephen Anthony Mobley was found guilty of the murder of John C. Collins. The case was one of the first to introduce the concept of a dysfunctional MAO-A gene as a factor in the courtroom. Mobley was sentenced to death and executed in 2005. The hypothetical case used some of the same descriptive details, (e.g., the assailant attacked his victim during a restaurant robbery) but, importantly, was not a murder conviction, and thus, not a capital crime.
[2] They chose men because previous investigations have shown that men frequently score lower on standard tests of empathy than women.
[3] One final point about this study that was interesting to me- although it seems, on the surface, to be more relevant to a study of how potential jurors make decisions, one of the recommendations based on the findings is for potential treatment of psychopaths.

2 comments:

Riley Zeller-Townson said...

Clearly, we need to have the entire jury sitting in futuristic fMRI machines for the duration of the proceeding, and have a little red light go off every time one of them displays too much of the neural correlate of empathy (so we can pause the trial till they calm themselves down). One step closer to being judged by 12 vulcans! Kidding aside, interesting stuff here Cyd. Picking on one of the questions you ended with: is there some unified justification for ignoring some (what kind?) prejudicial remarks? I would imagine the trial of one's peers is meant to foster some degree of empathy to the defendant- is there a defined 'just empathy' vs 'unjust empathy'? (which the neuroimaging folks could then try to tease apart?)

Cyd Cipolla said...

Hello Riley!
You have hit exactly on something about all of this that is so fascinating to me- that is, the sense that we could somehow fit empathic reactions into the rubric of evidence. The idea of just vs. unjust empathy is one in which the emotional responses of the jury are regulated like admissible evidence. Generally, during a trial, the judge tells them to ignore any outburst or reference to something inadmissible, and also tells them to ignore prejudicial remarks, based on the idea that the jury should be making their decision free of personal feelings and according only to the information given to them by the lawyers (and someone with better philosophical training than I have should jump in here to explain why our legal system seems to have been formulated according to the principles of Surak ).
The thing is, pretty much everyone already knows that this system doesn't actually work (on Law and Order they usually say "you can't unring a bell"). What is interesting to me with these studies is that they not only confirm that, but also quantify the "Clarence Darrow" effect, or the sense that the opening and closing statements are way more important than they should be, and thus perhaps open up a conversation about how our ideas about how a jury can (and cannot) make decisions. Right now, it seems there is just a massive disconnect between how they are instructed to behave and how they are manipulated to behave.

And you are absolutely correct to say that being tried by one's peers juries implies empathy, and is the precise reason WHY we have jury trials. I think the George Mason study shows perhaps humans are quite capable of sorting out empathy from judgment, at least in certain circumstances, or at least in letting that empathy guide them in a way consistent with a dispassionate review of facts without actually being dispassionate. And if that is the case- it possible that instructing juries to disregard emotion actually has some other sort of effect?