Response to “Society Does Not Make Gender” by Dr. Larry Young and Brian Alexander
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"A queer symbol of new gender image" by Finnish artist Susi Waegelein |
Admirably, Young and Alexander use the brain sex theory to argue for an acceptance of gender non-conforming children. They write, “so rather than seeing threat, we should embrace all shades of gender, whether snips and snails, sugar and spice, or somewhere in between.” However, there are (at least) four major problems with their argument: they essentialize gender; they uncritically embrace human brain organization theory; they uncritically embrace the double-edged sword of essentialism on behalf of transgender people; and they selectively (mis)use evidence about intersex and transgender people to support an ideological claim about the innateness of gender differences.
Essentializing sex/gender
In their post, Young and Alexander write, “Society -- toy makers, churches, parents, fashion magazines -- does not make gender.” They go on to argue, “Such [hormonally driven brain] organization, not advertising, is why boys, as a group, are more likely to shoot a doll full of BBs, while girls, as a group, are more likely to dress dolls and "nurture" them.” They also chastise most feminists for trying to “ignore real differences between typical boys and girls.”
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Do these things really not make gender? Photographs by Janet McKnight |
Uncritical embrace of human brain organization theory
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Image from Harvard University Press |
Uncritical embrace of the double-edged sword of essentialism
In another post for the Neuroethics Blog, Cyd Cipolla talks about the “double-edged sword of essentialism” and sexual orientation. A number of gay-rights supporters have argued that scientific evidence for the innateness of homosexuality (a gay person is “born this way”) should lead to an increase in acceptance for homosexuality. However, as Cyd points out, depending on your already formed beliefs about homosexuality, you could also use scientific evidence for the innateness of homosexuality either to develop biological/medical “treatments” for homosexuality or to conclude that homosexual people can’t be “fixed” and thus should be eradicated. At the same time, calling for gay rights on the basis of the innateness of homosexuality excludes from the conversation those gay people who do not believe their sexuality is innate (remember the furor over Cynthia Nixon’s comments?).
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Classic "born this way" argument for gay rights Are they also are referencing the hypothesized relationship between sexual orientation and handedness? Picture by Photo Munki |
However, as in the case of sexual orientation, this plea for acceptance on the basis of innateness is double-edged sword. The “brain sex theory” could also be used to develop biological/medical “treatments” for transgender identity/behavior. At the same time, arguing that gender is fixed before birth (even if arguing that gender may be incongruent with chromosomes and/or genitals) may exclude gender-fluid people from the conversation (to my knowledge, the brain organization theory doesn’t account well for gender fluidity, if I’m wrong, please let me know).
Selective (mis)uses of evidence about intersex and transgender people to support an ideological claim about the innateness of gender differences
Some feminist scholars and queer theorists have used intersex people or transgender people as evidence to support arguments about the social construction of gender (for a critique, see Invisible Lives by Vivian Namaste). Alternatively, a number of scientists have used intersex people as evidence to support arguments about the innateness of gender differences. Both uses are problematic if the ideological lens employed in any particular argument obscures the complexity of intersex or transgender lives.
In their post, Young and Alexander use studies of people with 5-alpha reductase deficiency (5-ARD) to provide evidence for the innateness of gender (people with 5-ARD are exposed to male-typical levels of androgens prenatally, but appear to be female until puberty, at which point their bodies become more male-typical looking). Jordan-Young extensively critiques the interpretation of studies of people with 5-ARD offered by brain-organization theorists (see pages 66-69). Of the use of any study of intersex people to support brain-organization theory, Jordan-Young writes, “the controversy recounted above highlights the difficulty in deciding whether psychosexual differences among intersex people are due to the direct effect of hormones on the brain, or to other factors like indirect effects on behavior via the development of atypical genitals, or the experience of illness and multiple surgeries” (78).
Although Young and Alexander don’t quite argue that transgender people provide evidence for the innateness of gender, some studies have made precisely this claim (e.g. Garcia-Falgueras et al. 2011). As in the case of the use of intersex people as evidence for gender-innateness, I believe the use of transgender subjects as evidence gender-innateness often obscures the complexity of transgender lives. Ironically enough, some of the gender non-conforming children described by Ruth Padawer don’t seem to be well accounted for by the “brain sex theory.” One boy, Alex, switches back and forth between feminine and masculine dress and behavior. A second boy, Jose, went through a long period during which he wanted to dress and behave in “girly” ways. By age 9, he was much less interested in wearing dresses, although he still liked to play with dolls. Understanding these complex lives requires understanding the role of ever-changing ideas about what are appropriate dress and behavior for boys and girls and the role of biology in the production of sex/gender identity and behavior.
A simple plea
In sum, while I agree with the main conclusion of Young and Alexander’s post (that we should embrace all shades of gender), the way they make their argument is problematic as it essentializes gender, uncritically accepts human brain organization theory, bases a call for transgender acceptance on biological essentialism, and (mis)uses studies of intersex people to support an ideological claim about gender essentialism.
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Image from Routledge |
I end with a simple plea: regardless of the relative contributions of genetics, prenatal hormones, parenting, environment of rearing, social expectations about gender, or personal agency in the production of any gender non-conforming child’s sex/gender identity or presentation, all gender non-conforming children deserve love and support and they deserve to be free from harassment and bullying, especially at school. Period.
Want to cite this post?
Gupta, K. (2012). Response to “Society Does Not Make Gender” by Dr. Larry Young and Brian Alexander. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2012/08/response-to-society-does-not-make.html
Thanks for this great post, Kristina! Do you think non-human animals have gender?
ReplyDeleteI think one important point to note is that scientists often use gender and sex interchangeably. This raises the question of whether non-human animals have "gender". If we consider that gender is a social construct (which should be, in part, informed by science) used to describe humans then we must be cautious when ascribing "gender" to non-human animals, especially in experimental design.
That said, I think there might be ways one could examine gender in animals. If we consider "gender" to be a product of culture, then one could argue that non-human animals have been documented to have emergent culture (e.g. work of Frans de Waal and others). But then words like "gender" would need to be used judiciously, taking into account the culture/context of the experimental subject.
So what do you think? Do Larry's voles have genders?
Both the Young/Alexander post, as well as the comments made directly on that post (I was glad to see that there are others making some of the same critiques you've skillfully assembled here!) are quite brief, and tend to only support one viewpoint at a time. I suppose on the one hand that facilitates further discussion, but at the expense of ever getting all (or most) of the relevant information in one spot at a time. For instance, "Society Does Not Make Gender" doesn't include a definition of gender (though one might be implied)-a fact that caused a cascade of discussion in the comments about sex vs gender and the accuracy of the post under different definitions. I guess I'm wondering if you think that "Society Does Not Make Gender" might have actually been more successful (in engaging the public in discussion) because it was less complete, despite being less critical?
ReplyDeleteKaren, that's a really interesting question. Since, as you point out, gender requires "culture", we would have to examine chimpanzees, as they are one of the few species which appear to engage in culturally defined behaviors (others include cetaceans) and probably the best-studied example overall.
ReplyDeleteThere are many definitions of "culture", but some of more durable characterizations include transmission and lack of ecological dependance. For example, some wild populations of chimpanzees have learned to crack nuts using a stone 'hammer' and 'anvil', while other populations, with plenty of access to the same nuts, have not developed the technology. Young chimps learn nut-cracking behaviors through observing adults and in this manner the behavior, or "cultural tradition", is passed on.
If you look at one of the most (probably) exhaustive list of cultural behaviors in chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999), though, of 65 behaviors, none have been labeled as sex-specific, although I imagine since a lot are probably groupable under "dominance displays", there probably are sex differences.
Does this mean chimpanzees have gender? I would argue - possibly - since sex seems to play a role in behaviors which are transmitted through generations and are variable across populations. Does chimpanzee "gender" compare to human "gender"? Probably not - there is a difference in degree that is arguably extensive enough that it likely yields differences in kind. For example, it is doubtful that chimpanzees reflect on their own behavior and whether it is appropriate for their gender.
As for voles - I'd have to say no - a) as far as I know, no one has argued that voles have culture, and b) if chimps lack the ruminative capabilities which may be crucial to the full experience of "gender", I think the bridge for voles is much too far.
Hi Karen, Riley, and Katherine,
ReplyDeleteThanks for all your great comments!
I'm replying to all together, as there are some similar themes.
One is the question of what does gender mean. In the humanities and social sciences, we tend to define gender as the “socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women” and sex as “the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women.” So for some people in the humanities and social sciences, to say “society does not make gender” is tantamount to saying “there is no such thing as gender, only sex.” As Karen points out, many people in the sciences use sex and gender interchangeably, which I believe is what Young and Alexander are doing. In my post, I use the term “sex/gender” (as other some other scholars do) to signify the fact that we can’t necessarily separate out the social and the biological aspects of “sex/gender” as they are co-constitutive.
As for whether animals have gender, this is a great question and I agree with everything Katherine said. I am far from an expert on primates, but I believe there is some evidence of gender among certain primate species. Cordelia Fine cites Frances Burton, who apparently has found that there are gender norms that vary within a species of macaques – in a troop in Gibraltar, the males care for infants (and this role is apparently taught to young males), while in a troop from the same species in Morocoo, male care of infants is less significant. I don’t know enough to evaluate the specifics of these claims, however I suspect the general point is accurate. Like Katherine, I seriously doubt that voles have gender.
As for Riley’s last question: was "Society Does Not Make Gender" more successful (in engaging the public in discussion) because it was less complete, despite being less critical? I’m not sure. I think it may have riled people up, but I’m not sure how useful it is to keep having polarized debates about these issues. More critical/thoughtful pieces might provoke less response, but perhaps we would avoid having the same discussion over and over?
Kristina